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GloAu9 ssary
dt0010 Adaptation Refers to the situation in which an exposure
to a sensory input, such as seeing the color red, continues
for a sufficiently long period of time so that the neuronal
response is reduced when the same or a similar sensory
input is experienced again a brief time later (usually
immediately or within about 1 s). Many mechanisms have
been proposed and vary with the particular circumstances of
adaptation and may in some cases involve more complex
implicit memory processes.
dt0015 Amnesia Refers to memory that is impaired selectively
relative to other cognitive abilities, such as language,
attention, and perception. The term is usually reserved for
problems with conscious, explicit memory following
damage to the medial temporal lobe system. Implicit
memory is relatively spared in amnesia.
dt0020 Conscious Refers to the experience of being aware of
oneself and the environment, and encompasses any
perceptions, thoughts, and feelings that one is aware of at
the moment
dt0025 Dissociation Dissociation in neuropsychology can be
single or double or more. A single dissociation is
demonstrated if a patient or group with a particular kind of
brain dysfunction (e.g., to temporal cortex) is impaired on
one task (e.g., an implicit memory test) but normal relative
to a matched control group on another task (e.g., an explicit
memory test). The best evidence comes from a double or
higher dissociation. A double dissociation is demonstrated if
a patient or group with a particular kind of brain
dysfunction (e.g., to temporal cortex) is impaired on task A
(e.g., an implicit memory test) but not another task B (e.g.,
an explicit memory test), whereas another patient or group
with another kind of brain dysfunction (e.g., to frontal
cortex) is impaired on task B but not task A, both relative to a
matched normal control group.
dt0030 Lesion Lesion in the brain refers to damage to neuronal
cells due to a variety of potential causes, such as stroke,
tumor, or gunshot wounds.
dt0035Neocortex Newly evolved cerebral cortex of the central
nervous system. It has six layers and four lobes (occipital,
temporal, parietal, and frontal). Most, if not all, implicit
memory is stored in the neocortex, particularly in areas
beyond the primary sensorimotor areas.
dt0040Neuropsychology A clinical specialization or field of
scientific research focused on patients with brain
dysfunction and characterizing the resulting cognitive
problems.
dt0045Occipital cortex Cortex in the occipital lobe is the most
posterior region of neocortex and is responsible for visual
perception. It includes the primary visual area (V1) in striate
cortex and adjacent prestriate or extrastriate visual cortex
lying anterior to V1. This lobe is retinotopically organized
such that adjacent neurons respond to different but
nonoverlapping parts of the visual field. Extrastriate visual
areas contribute to implicit memory that involves perceptual
representations.
dt0050Temporal lobe Neocortex that is located ventrally and
includes association areas for visual processing, primary and
association areas for auditory processing, and multimodal
association areas. Lateral parts of the temporal lobe support
advanced visual and auditory perceptual processing,
perceptual and conceptual knowledge and implicit memory.
By contrast, the medial temporal lobe (hippocampus and
parahippocampal cortical region) and related structures
(e.g., connected thalamic nuclei, mammillary bodies, fornix,
and retrosplenial cortex) has been implicated in explicit
memory.
dt0055Transcranial magnetic stimulation Refers to a noninvasive
neuroscience technique that uses an electromagnetic coil to
produce weak electrical activity in superficial regions of the
cortex. This causes neural activity over these regions to be
altered, typically disrupted so as to be impaired, enabling the
causal role of these regions in cognition to be inferred. Logic
of using the technique is the same as neuropsychology,
enabling transient single or double dissociations to be
produced in normal participants.
p0010 Memory can influence behavior based on people’s prior expe-
rience in the world, even without them being aware that this
has happened. For example, people ride bicycles years after
initially learning how, read a book faster and with greater
comprehension the second time around, and make decisions
about objects around them faster and more accurately as they
gain more experience with them. In such cases, memory influ-
ences performance implicitly, without awareness. By contrast,
people are consciously aware of explicit memory when they
categorize objects or read words or when they recognize peo-
ple, places, and objects as familiar or recollect details about
their prior experience with them.
s0010Early Au4History
p0015The notion of memory without awareness has been traced to
thinkers as early as Descartes. This philosopher referred essen-
tially to fear conditioning in which frightening childhood
experiences can have a lifelong influence, even though one
cannot remember the origin of the fear-inducing event. Leibniz
also referred to insensible or unconscious perceptions that
influence behavior without conscious memory of the source
of such influences. However, among early thinkers, Maine de
Biran offered the most detailed and the deepest analysis of
memory for unconscious habits and their influence on
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cognition and behavior. This philosopher has been credited
with explaining that a habit can, with sufficient experience,
eventually influence performance automatically and without
being accompanied by awareness of using memory. He also
distinguished between habits of motor actions and habits of
emotional expression, and distinguished these two types of
habits from conscious recollection (i.e., explicit memory).
This is essentially an initial version of the now predominant,
multiple systems theory of memory that distinguishes between
systems for implicit memory and explicit memory. Herbart
further proposed that ideas can lie below a threshold for
awareness but still influence conscious cognition. Around
this time, many philosophers started to develop further ideas
about unconscious processing. For example, Hering criticized
the large body of earlier scholarship for focusing exclusively on
explicit memory and introduced the idea of organic or uncon-
scious memory. Also around this time, psychologists, biolo-
gists, and medical scientists further articulated ideas about
organic (implicit) memory and how it relates, or does not, to
explicit memory. For example, by the 1890s, Freud described
how his hysterical amnesia patients could not recall the trau-
matic events leading to the hysteria but still revealed memory
for those events in other indirect ways, and Freud is well
known for emphasizing the importance and power of uncon-
scious memory on behavior. Notably, Ebbinghaus conducted
the first true experiments on memory, but he focused exclu-
sively on explaining explicit memory. Nonetheless, his primary
testing method involved assessment of savings on relearning
previously studied lists. Relearning did not require recollecting
the preceding episode or lists but rather just relearning the list
now presented again. This fits the definition of an implicit
memory phenomenon. Indeed, Ebbinghaus acknowledged
that his method of measuring savings on relearning assessed
unconscious memory, as has been confirmed empirically more
recently. Finally, it is notable that McDougall was the first
psychologist to use the terms implicit and explicit memory.
s0015 Indirect Memory Tests
p0020 Implicit memory is memory that can be reactivated without
a conscious strategy or intent to retrieve the memory and/or
without conscious awareness that the memory has been reacti-
vated. Consequently, changes in behavioral performance with
more experience relative to less experience demonstrate im-
plicit memory. Such tests of memory are indirect. People are
not instructed to use their memory to do the task as they are
on direct memory tests, such as categorization, recognition, or
recall. Instead, on an indirect memory test, they do the task
and perform differently depending upon their prior experience
with aspects of the task, without awareness.
p0025 Indirect memory tests are the standard approach to assess
implicit memory. On the other hand, direct tests are the
standard approach to assess explicit memory. However, a
thorny issue in memory research is that both direct and
indirect memory tests can potentially reactivate both explicit
memory with awareness and implicit memory without aware-
ness to some extent. This remains a problem despite decades
of research aimed at dissociating implicit and explicit mem-
ory. Nonetheless, several aspects of implicit memory have
become clear.
s0020Varieties of Priming
p0030To reveal implicit memory on an indirect test, by definition,
people are not asked about their memory. Thus a conscious
report about memory cannot be used to measure implicit
memory. Instead, a measure taken in response to an item that
is old (i.e., repeated, studied) is compared to the response to
a new item (i.e., un- or nonrepeated, un- or nonstudied item).
New items are basically the control condition for the experi-
mental memory condition(s). Priming is the difference in
behavioral performance between an old item relative to a
new item (Figure 1). For example, people press one of two
keys to report whether an object is larger or smaller than a
shoebox. Faster or more accurate key presses to old than new
objects demonstrate priming. The priming difference is taken
to reveal the magnitude of implicit memory.
p0035Numerous studies have revealed some factors that con-
sistently affect or do not affect priming. Priming is greater for
meaningful than meaningless items (e.g., real words vs. non-
sense letter strings). Priming can be specific to the sensory
modality, becoming smaller when the modality changes
from study to test. Priming can be perceptually specific, being
smaller when stimuli at study and test are perceptually dissimi-
lar than similar (e.g., resemblance of look or sound). While
depth of processing (i.e., shallow perceptual vs. deep semantic)
affects explicit memory (e.g., recognition), it has less or mini-
mal effects on priming. Based on these findings, implicit
memory is thus modality-specific, perceptually specific, and
relatively insensitive to the depth of processing.
s0025Short- and Long-Term
p0040Implicit memory can last briefly (short-term implicit memory)
or indefinitely (long-term implicit memory). Priming effects
have been shown to last to some degree for 48weeks or
more, especially with meaningful pictures. In general, priming
reflects long-term implicit memory when it is shown to last for
2min or more or 4–9 or more other items are shown between
the first and second presentation of the repeated item. Short-
term implicit memory includes cases of immediate repetition
in which an item is repeated with no other items in between
first and second presentations, and items repeat with a very
brief time interval of usually <2 s and as little as no time
between them. While long-term priming depends upon asso-
ciative and long-term implicit memory processes, immediate
repetition priming depends upon other memory mechanisms.
Immediate repetition priming depends upon (1) working
memory, (2) automatically sustained activation in knowledge
networks, and/or, (3) for extremely brief presentations of items
(e.g., <1 s) and extremely short delays (i.e., 200ms or less), on
nonassociative habituation (including sensory adaptation).
Most research on implicit memory has focused on long-term
priming. Short-term varieties have been the focus of studies of
working memory, perception, and semantic memory. Thus
most of the rest of this review focuses on long-term priming.
s0030Processing
p0045Varieties of priming vary not only in how long they last but
also the processes that drive the effects. To appreciate the
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different varieties of priming, a few words about processing
and memory are needed. Transfer appropriate processing and
encoding-specificity theories of memory emphasize the rela-
tion between information processing at study and processing
during the memory test. For example, transfer appropriate
processing theory says that memory depends upon the degree
to which the processes recruited during the study (or learning)
phase transfer appropriately to the memory test. Transfer will
depend upon the degree to which the memory test recruits the
same processes recruited during learning. The more similar the
processes at study and test, the better memory will be.
p0050In a similar vein, Roediger and colleagues have distinguished
between data-driven and concept-driven tasks. Data-driven tasks
during the memory test depend heavily on nonsemantic (i.e.,
perceptual, surface, or motor) processing. Consequently, the
memory revealed on such tasks will be greatest if the study task
also engaged the same nonsemantic information processing. On
the other hand, concept-driven tasks during the memory test
depend heavily on semantic processing (i.e., meaning, concepts,
categories). Consequently, the memory revealed on such tasks
will be greatest if the study task also engaged the same semantic
information processing.
Behavioral
repetition priming 
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Figure 1f0010 Behavioral and neural effects related to implicit memory. Shown are data for a new object from a noncanonical view (e.g., top view of a
bucket) and an old object repeated from the same noncanonical view as had been studied earlier in a separate learning session; note, behavioral and
fMRI data from an fMRI version and ERP data from an ERP version of Schendan and Kutas’ (2003) experiment on implicit memory during visual
object categorization. (a) One measure of repetition priming is faster response times (RTs) for old relative to a new items. (b) Event-related
brain potentials (ERPs) show that long-term repetition effects are observed only after about 200ms. Shown is the repetition effect on the N3
complex to objects at a right frontal head site relative to the mean mastoids. The N3 is smaller (i.e., less negative) for old than new visual objects.
(c) Relative to new items, repeated items show a reduced blood oxygenation level (Au1 BOLD) response, known as the repetition suppression effect. Percent
signal change extracted from lateral occipital sulcus in ventral object processing area (see brightest yellow region in (d)). (d) fMRI activation (new
greater than old objects) is shown on an individual canonical brain (Montreal Neurological Institute). Neural repetition suppression related to implicit
memory is found in ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and ventral and dorsal visual object processing areas of association cortex.
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s0035 Content
s0040 Perceptual Implicit Memory
p0055 Repetition priming refers to facilitated processing due to recent
experience with the same stimulus. Repeating the exact same
stimulus produces the most priming. Perceptual implicit mem-
ory changes perceptual processing. On a data- versus concept-
driven account, perceptual repetition priming will be revealed
best when data-driven tasks are used for the memory test. For
example, on perceptual identification tasks, a word or object is
presented very briefly (e.g., 50ms). People try to read the word
or name the object. Performance on such tasks is typically less
accurate (e.g., <70% correct). Repeating the same word or
object can increase this accuracy. The implicit memory driving
the priming is perceptual because the priming effect is larger
when the perceptual form of the item remains the same
between the study and test phases than when the physical
form changes. For example, priming is larger when a word is
repeated in the same than a different font, or an object
is repeated in the same view than a different one. Nonetheless,
repetition priming typically does not drop to zero even when
the perceptual form changes substantially as long as the core
concept of the item remains the same between repetitions. For
example, the word ‘dog’ in lowercase and uppercase (‘DOG’)
stillmean the same, and a dog seen fromabove or the side is still
the same object. The priming effect remaining after a change in
perceptual form from study to test is thought to reflect concep-
tual implicit memory. Thus, when exactly the same item is
repeated, it is likely that both perceptual and conceptual
implicit memory drive the repetition priming effect.
s0045 Conceptual Implicit Memory
p0060 By the data- versus concept-driven account, conceptual implicit
memory will be revealed best when concept-driven tasks are
used for the memory test. For example, when the perceptual
form of the item changes between the study and test phases,
any priming effect must depend upon aspects of the item that
remain the same despite the perceptual changes, such as the
meaning of the item. Conceptual implicit memory has been
demonstrated when the modal form of the item changes from
study to test. For example, repetition priming has been found
when a picture of an object is studied and then its name is
presented at test, and vice versa, though picture to word priming
is often larger and more robust than the reverse.
s0050 Semantic Implicit Memory
p0065 Semantic priming can be considered a special case of concep-
tual priming in the sense that conceptual information or mean-
ing drives the effect. However, both perceptual and conceptual
implicit memory are revealed using repetition priming para-
digms, and both can be long-lasting. By contrast, semantic
priming paradigms all involve immediate repetition. No
other items and only a brief time of typically 1 s or less inter-
vene between the prime (i.e., study phase item) and the target
(i.e., test phase version of the repeated item). Indeed, semantic
priming effects do not typically last for more than a second or
at most a few seconds.
p0070 On semantic priming tasks, the critical prime and target
stimuli share no perceptual features, only some aspect of
meaning. For example, the priming word ‘nurse’ may be pre-
sented 500ms before the target word ‘doctor.’ Subjects may
read the priming word and then perform a lexical decision task
on the target letter string. They decide whether the letter string
is a real English word or not (e.g., a nonword like ‘XPFQNV’ or
pseudo-word like ‘BRILLIG’). Semantic priming is demon-
strated when response times to target words are faster when
they are related than unrelated to the prime words. Semantic
priming effects depend upon the associative links among
aspects of knowledge in a cortical neural network.
s0055Brain Basis of Implicit Memory
s0060Memory Systems
p0075Convergent evidence for dissociations between implicit and
explicit memory and other varieties of memory led to the
multiple systems theory of memory. By this account, different
types of memory depend upon different brain systems. The
implicit system supports implicit memory, and the explicit
system supports explicit memory. Themost important evidence
for the multiple systems theory has come from dissociations
between measures of implicit and explicit memory in patients
with brain damage. However, convergent evidence from other
methods (i.e., behavioral, neuroimaging, and brain potentials)
is required to establish a memory system based on at least three
criteria. (1) Double dissociations must establish that different
brain systems are necessary for two different memory systems.
For example, for implicit and explicit memory, damage to the
implicit system impairs implicit but not explicit memory,
whereas damage to the explicit system impairs explicit but not
implicit memory. (2) Class-inclusion operationsmust be estab-
lished, showing that the memory system operates on a diverse
information (e.g., words, objects, faces, places, visual, auditory)
during a particular class of tasks (e.g., categorization vs. recall).
(3) A list of properties of the system must be specified that also
describes how the system relates to other systems. All such
evidence has been found to establish an implicit memory sys-
tem in the neocortex outside of medial temporal lobe regions.
Nonetheless, it is important to realize that single process
accounts, including computational models, have been pro-
posed that use a single memory system. Such single process
accounts can explain findings of differences between different
memory phenomena, such as priming and episodic recogni-
tion. This can be taken as evidence against the multiple systems
theory. However, to date, support for these alternatives primar-
ily constitutes evidence that they can, in principle, explain dis-
sociations between memory phenomena and other results.
Positive evidence for single process accounts has not yet been
compellingly provided.
p0080A possible exception could be single process accounts
emerging from grounded (embodied) cognition theory. By
this account, memory depends upon modality-specific systems
for sensory processing (i.e., vision, hearing, touch, taste, smell)
and motor action processing, as well as introspective states
(e.g., emotion). In this view, memory, including implicit mem-
ory, also involves the cortical processes of simulation that
recapitulate prior processing. During a simulation, prior infor-
mation processing of the study item is activated again when
a repeated item is processed later. Simulation takes place in
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the divergence–convergence zones of the cortex beyond the
primary sensorimotor areas. The critical difference between
the theories is that the multiple systems theory proposes an
amodal system apart from any sensorimotor areas, and sup-
ports conceptual knowledge and semantic memory for word,
object, person, and place meanings, which underlies semantic
and conceptual implicit memory. In contrast, the grounded
cognition account says that sensorimotor processing areas
underlie semantic memory, wholly or partially in addition to
an amodal system. Thus the distinction between perceptual
and conceptual implicit memory in the multiple systems
account disappears in a grounded cognition account, which
would instead have a single implicit memory system embodied
in the sensorimotor systems. While some grounded cognition
theories posit a single memory system for all types of memory
(e.g., for both implicit and explicit varieties), other versions
of grounded cognition also make no perceptual-conceptual
distinction but are otherwise compatible with (or identical
to) the multiple systems theories of memory.
s0065 Neuropsychology
s0070 Implicit memory in amnesia
p0085 The first clues about the brain basis of implicit memory came
from cases of neurological patients with memory problems
due to amnesia. Amnesic patients have medial temporal lobe
damage and are impaired severely on explicit memory tests of
recall and recognition. Korsakoff recorded the earliest anec-
dotal evidence of implicit memory in his amnesia patients.
One patient was given an electric shock but failed to recollect
this experience. Nonetheless, upon seeing the same device, he
thought that the doctor might shock him. Likewise, Claparade
pricked an amnesic with a pin. This patient later refused to
shake the doctor’s hand, despite having no recollection of the
earlier unpleasant event.
p0090 Studies of patients with amnesia syndrome have provided
perhaps the most important information about implicit mem-
ory. This is because these patients can be considered examples
of people who have a selective impairment in explicit memory
but spared implicit memory. As mentioned, an indirect mem-
ory test used to reveal implicit memory, in principle, also can
be contaminated incidentally with episodic explicit memory.
For example, when categorizing an object repeated from a prior
study episode, a normal subject will do the task faster andmore
accurately with old than new objects, demonstrating repetition
priming. However, they may also incidentally consciously rec-
ognize that they saw the object earlier in the experiment,
demonstrating conscious episodic explicit memory for the
prior study experience. In contrast, a patient with medial tem-
poral lobe amnesia will be severely impaired on the latter
conscious recognition process. Consequently, relative to nor-
mal people, in amnesia, any implicit memory measure is min-
imally or not contaminated with episodic explicit memory.
Amnesic patients can thus provide potentially the purest
behavioral measures of implicit memory. However, this advan-
tage of amnesia research was not realized until studies of the
famous amnesic patientAu5 HM who had an exceptionally severe
amnesia following bilateral medial temporal lobe removal in
1953. Research with HM since the 1960s demonstrates remark-
ably intact abilities to improve performance on some tasks
with repeated experience, despite failing to recollect having
experienced the materials before or recognize them as familiar.
This was taken to demonstrate spared nonconscious memory,
that is, implicit memory, in amnesia. Since then a large body of
research has aimed at defining the memory preserved in amne-
sia, which is working memory, implicit learning, and implicit
memory.
p0095The large body of research with HM and other amnesics has
demonstrated memory without conscious awareness for a wide
variety of perceptual and conceptual repetition priming tasks
and for semantic priming. Most of these studies used materials
that were already known to the subjects, mostly real words and
real objects. In contrast, evidence for spared implicit memory
in amnesia is more mixed when novel materials are used that
are not meaningful or include information with no preexisting
representation, such as nonwords, novel visual patterns, or
unrelated word pairs. Some studies show priming in amnesia,
while others do not. The evidence suggests that implicit mem-
ory for novel information depends on the task and perhaps
also the severity of the amnesia.
p0100While damage to the medial temporal lobe can produce
amnesia for episodic explicit memory, it is important to note
that the rest of the brain is intact, including the rest of the
neocortex and subcortical structures. Consequently, spared
implicit memory in amnesia indicates that implicit memory
depends upon these spared structures. In particular, the
implicit memory that supports priming depends upon the
neocortex, particularly secondary and associative areas beyond
primary sensorimotor regions.
p0105To avoid the circularity of defining any memory preserved
in amnesia as implicit memory, it is important to obtain con-
vergent evidence from other methods, of which evidence is
substantial, though not without controversy. The vast literature
on priming from studying normal subjects in cognitive psy-
chology experiments using behavioral measures provides one
set of evidence. Other evidence comes from other areas of
neuroscience beyond neuropsychological work on amnesia.
s0075Impaired implicit memory with cortical lesions
p0110The gold standard in neuropsychology is to obtain a double
dissociation. Impaired explicit memory with spared implicit
memory in amnesia constitutes a single dissociation. To demon-
strate a double dissociation, patients need to be foundwho show
spared explicit memory with impaired implicit memory, prefer-
ably in the same experiment. Indeed, this has been found.
Patients with lateral occipital cortex damage or disconnection
between right and left occipital cortex show spared recognition
but impaired perceptual repetition priming. Patients with ante-
rior temporal lobe lesions show sparedperceptual implicitmem-
ory. Alzheimer’s disease damages the medial temporal lobe plus
higher association areas in the temporal lobe and other lobes.
These patients have impaired explicit recognition and recall, as
well as impaired conceptual repetition priming, but relatively
spared perceptual repetition priming. Transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) disrupts neural processing transiently and
has been used to show that disruption of processing in left
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) reduces both the cortical
and behavioral effects of repetition priming during a categoriza-
tion task. Consequently, VLPFC may be necessary to express
implicit memory behaviorally in a priming paradigm.
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s0080 Neurophysiology
s0085 Neuronal repetition effects in nonhuman primates
p0115 The best candidate for defining the neuronal basis of implicit
memory is repetition suppression effects. However, most of
this research has been done using short-term or immediate
stimulus repetition. Further, most of the stimuli are pictures
of objects, scenes, or faces, many of which would be unknown
to nonhuman primates. In contrast, most human implicit
memory studies use meaningful word stimuli or other known
and meaningful stimuli. It thus remains unclear the extent
to which nonhuman primate findings can explain human
implicit memory at the neuronal level. Nonetheless, it is clear
that neurons in the inferior temporal cortex along the ventral
visual pathway are selective for object shape, and the activity of
these neurons decreases with repetition. This neuronal repeti-
tion suppression occurs irrespective of whether the repeated
stimulus is a passively viewed nontarget for the behavioral task
or the target stimulus for the task. This suggests that repetition
suppression is automatic, as would be expected for the neuro-
nal mechanism of implicit memory. Short-term repetition sup-
pression involves an input-fatigue mechanism in which the
synaptic inputs to a neuron reduce their efficacywith repetition.
However, several other mechanisms have been proposed to
explain neuronal repetition suppression and implicit memory
and may apply to other types of implicit memory (e.g., long-
term). Further, evidence so far indicates that, like the human
behavioral phenomenon, neuronal repetition suppression var-
ies with delay between first and repeated presentations and
duration of the stimuli. The effect also varies with the similarity
between the test and study items, consistent with transfer
appropriate processing and encoding-specificity accounts of
memory. Other neuronal mechanisms may underlie other
types of implicit memory, particularly the long-term varieties.
s0090 Repetition suppression in human functional neuroimaging
p0120 Functional brain imaging studies have revealed a similar obser-
vation by measuring changes in regional blood oxygenation or
flow related to neural activity. Relative to the activation level
in response to new items, repeated items show a reduced
response, known as the repetition suppression effect (Figure 1).
This effect is sometimes referred to as functional magnetic
resonance adaptation (fMR-A) when the paradigm involves
immediate repetition or very short delays or interstimulus inter-
vals between first and second presentations. Notably fMR-A
uses suppression to infer the representational characteristics of
perceptual processing areas (e.g., representation of view, posi-
tion, size), analogous to the visual cognition approach of using
priming to infer how objects are represented (e.g., parts or
multiple views of an object). However, human and animal
evidence indicates that, as suggested based on behavioral evi-
dence, the neural mechanism differs between different varieties
of priming (e.g., fMR-A, immediate, and long-term). Mechan-
isms proposed for long-term implicit memorymay not apply to
short-term varieties, and conversely. This important consider-
ation has, however, not yet been addressed systematically,
leaving the neural mechanism unknown for the many neuro-
imaging studies using neural repetition suppression effects
to characterize the representational properties of implicit
memory.
p0125Nonetheless, some recent work has started to do so, and
some general principles about repetition suppression have
emerged. Neural suppression occurs in secondary and associa-
tive cortex as opposed to primary sensorimotor cortex. For
example, in the visual modality, early studies of priming-
related suppression implicated only the ventral visual stream
beyond primary visual cortex, like multiple systems accounts of
memory implicated only the ventral visual stream in percep-
tual implicit memory. Recent work, however, shows that short-
and long-term suppression occurs along both the ventral and
dorsal visual streams. Evidence also indicates that suppression
effects increase as processing proceeds from posterior to ante-
rior posterior processing areas, consistent with the larger
priming effects found behaviorally for conceptual priming
(e.g., involving more anterior temporal areas) than for percep-
tual priming (e.g., involving more posterior occipitotemporal
areas). Like behavioral priming measures of implicit memory,
neural suppression can show perceptual specificity, especially
in posterior perceptual processing areas. For example, object
processing areas along the ventral stream show suppression
that becomes smaller when repeated objects differ in viewpoint
and lighting conditions and show relative invariance despite
changes in size and spatial location; note, such a pattern is
expected for a brain region that represents categorical knowl-
edge about objects that can generalize across variations in size
and where the object is observed. However, the full range of
changes in perceptual properties has not yet been assessed for
short- and long-term repetition (e.g., view changes up to 60
tested).
p0130Overall, at a network level, the brain regions that show
suppression effects are parts of the active task network impli-
cated in selective attention and working memory, that also
includes secondary perceptual processing areas, lateral prefron-
tal cortex, and intraparietal sulcus. This network is anticorre-
lated in its activity pattern with a default, resting state network
implicated in episodic memory, mind wandering, and inter-
nally-directed attention. The default network includes medial
prefrontal cortex, cingulate cortex, retrosplenial cortex, lateral
posterior parietal cortex, and superior temporal gyrus. Consis-
tent with anticorrelation of the active task and default networks,
the default network regions show the opposite repetition effect.
They show repetition enhancement, that is, greater activation
for old than for new items. This is typically observed on epi-
sodic memory tests (e.g., recognition of an item as old and
familiar).
p0135Also like behavioral priming measures of implicit memory,
neural suppression can show task-specificity. For example,
when the task changes between the study phase and the mem-
ory test phase, suppression is reduced, especially in prefrontal
regions and fusiform gyrus in the left hemisphere. This finding
can be considered an example of violation of the transfer
appropriate processing principle of memory, which predicts
that processing differences between study and test will reduce
memory. The task changes that reduce suppression can include
inversions of the decision (e.g., Larger than a shoebox? vs.
‘Smaller than a shoebox?’). While systematic neuroimaging
studies have not yet been reported, behavioral studies suggest
that even inversions of the response key mapping may reduce
behavioral priming (e.g., yes and no mapped to 1 and 2 keys
vs. 2 and 1 keys, respectively). However, whether decision or
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motor-related aspects of the response are the locus of the
stimulus–response mapping effect remains to be established.
Nonetheless, this mapping clearly increases with repetition, as
the reduction is substantial with multiple repetitions and less
or none with a single repetition. Notably, most research on
implicit memory and behavioral priming has involved a single
repetition and so cannot depend substantially on stimulus–
response learning. Consistent with this, studies with amnesia
patients indicate that stimulus–response learning effects
depend upon the medial temporal lobe system for episodic
memory. Intriguingly, this suggests that stimulus–response
mapping influences on repetition priming are more properly
considered an episodic memory phenomenon in which epi-
sodic memory incidentally influences priming, instead of a
characteristic of the implicit memory system. After all, indirect
memory tests can recruit not only implicit but also explicit
memory. This also suggests that stimulus–response learning
cannot explain the remarkably spared priming effects estab-
lished in amnesia patients. Nonetheless, studies of stimulus–
response mapping and neural suppression have indicated that
top-down processing from prefrontal cortex to other brain
regions has a role in behavioral priming. For example, tran-
siently disrupting processing in the VLPFC reduces stimulus–
response learning effects, demonstrating a causal role.
p0140 Altogether, these human neuroscience findings have led to
the suggestion of multiple different mechanisms for repetition
suppression inpriming paradigms. The firstmechanism, referred
to here as the tuning account, is the classic explanation. This
account suggests that neural repetition suppression depends
upon sharpening or tuning of neuronal receptive fields due to
learning. The neural representation of the stimulus becomes
more precisely tuned to its preferred stimulus (e.g., the shape
of a particular dog from a specific view) with experience with
that stimulus. Such effects show perceptual specificity such that
memory decreases with changes in the perceptual form between
the learned version of the stimulus (e.g., a different view of the
dog or a different type of dog, say, poodle instead of collie) and
the memory test version of it. Suppression due to neuronal
tuning probably occurs in posterior perceptual processing areas
implicated in perceptual representation or knowledge systems.
Tuning-related suppression can also occur, to some extent, in
more advanced stages of stimulus processing, such as in anterior
temporal cortex for visual stimuli, implicated in conceptual
knowledge about stimuli (e.g., meaning of a word or object).
Indeed, grounded (embodied) theories of cognition would
implicate both posterior and anterior stimulus processing areas
because sensorimotor processing areas support not only percep-
tion and action but also meaning and memory. However, tun-
ing-related suppression seems tohave a limited relationshipwith
priming of behavioral performance on tasks that require proces-
sing stimulus meaning, such as categorization.
p0145 Consequently, a second mechanism has been proposed
more recently following new evidence that VLPFC has a causal
role in behavioral priming that is response-specific. This
account was motivated by the stimulus–response mapping
findings that switching the task decision mapping from study
to test reduces priming and repetition suppression. By this
account, top-down inputs from prefrontal cortex onto other
brain regions influence behavioral priming. Prefrontal cortex
is implicated in cognitive control, attention, and working
memory. These control processes can become more automatic
with increasing experience with an item. Consequently, the
association between the stimulus and these control processes
becomes stronger. This learning results in memory and behav-
ioral priming that is response-specific.
p0150Another explanation of behavioral priming uses a percep-
tual memory-based caching system to explain short-term prim-
ing withmeaningless perceptual patterns, which does not show
stimulus–response learning. By this computational account,
perceptual processing results in perceptual representations.
While meaningful stimuli engage processes related to categor-
izing and verbally labeling the stimulus, meaningless percep-
tual patterns do not; instead, they engage other perceptual
processes based on the task requirements, such as the size of
the object. A short-term perceptual memory process (i.e., the
‘cache’) briefly stores the binding of the percept and other
task-specific perceptual information. In posterior cortex, this
caching mechanism could presumably operate along with the
tuning mechanism to explain implicit memory and priming,
regardless of the task switch from study to test.
p0155At the neuronal level, several mechanisms may also under-
lie repetition suppression. The input-fatigue mechanism (for
adaptation with immediate repetition) and tuning and cach-
ing system mechanisms (for long-term perceptual repetition
suppression) are three examples. However, other mechanisms
are also possible and could also explain response-invariant
suppression. Like the input-fatigue version, a firing rate-
dependent fatigue mechanism (for adaptation) suggests that
neuronal responses decrease with use (i.e., firing fatigues),
but, in this case, repetition suppression is proportional to
the firing rate in response to the first presentation. However,
so far evidence has not favored this account. A facilitation
model suggests that the time course of the neuronal response
(i.e., onset latency and/or duration) decreases with repetition.
While neuroimaging has provided some support, this can be
assessed better using neurophysiological measures with tem-
poral precision within the range of neuronal activity (milli-
seconds). In humans, electromagnetic brain potentials have
supported facilitation models of long-term repetition, as cate-
gory knowledge is activated about 50ms earlier for repeated
than for new objects.
s0095Repetition effects on electromagnetic brain potentials in
humans reveal the timing of long-term implicit memory
p0160Event-related electrical potentials have defined the time course
of memory processes in the neocortex. This evidence indicates
that, for everyday cognition, long-term implicit memory starts
relatively late in information processing, after the initial bot-
tom-up activation through perceptual processing areas. Brain
potentials show that long-term repetition effects are observed
only after about 200ms (Figure 1). The repetition effects are
relatively long-lasting, until around 400 or 500ms or so, indi-
cating that implicit memory effects on information processing
typically last for about 300ms or longer. In particular, repeti-
tion typically affects mid-latency negativities between 200 and
500ms that reflect activation of knowledge about words,
objects, and faces. Negativity is typically reduced for repeated
relative to new items. With meaningless stimuli, these effects
are minimal or none. This is consistent with the idea that
implicit memory reflects reactivation of perceptual and
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conceptual knowledge representation systems. While priming
can occur for nonsense stimuli, such effects are short-term and
response-invariant, and explained using the caching mecha-
nism. By contract, long-term implicit memory of meaningful
stimuli involves facilitation, tuning, and perhaps stimulus–
response mapping mechanisms of neuronal suppression. The
time course evidence indicates that all these mechanisms,
under most circumstances, involve feedback from prefrontal
to posterior perceptual and conceptual processing areas and/or
feedback within the processing areas alone. By this time, elec-
trical potentials recorded inside the skull at the cortical surface
indicate that neurons in prefrontal cortex have started to
become active. Brain potential evidence thus indicates that
long-term implicit memory, which leads to neural repetition
suppression and which is related to priming involves top-down
feedback from prefrontal cortex to other brain regions.
p0165 Nonetheless, a handful of studies have shown repetition
effects on earlier brain potentials not only for short-term but
also long-term repetition. These effects are found on transient
potentials related to the initial feedforward pass through per-
ceptual processing areas, as well as automatic recurrent and
feedback within these areas (but not yet from prefrontal cor-
tex). The input-fatigue mechanism has been implicated in
adaptation (immediate repetition) effects. The long-term
effects are related to perceptual priming, regardless of meaning,
and have been found with meaningful and meaningless sti-
muli. At last one such early repetition effect has been clearly
linked to perceptual grouping processes implicated in gestalt
perception of an object that is more than the sum of its parts.
However, to observe such effects, the task may need to focus
attention on perceptual details. For example, one study
required subjects to determine if the nonsense visual pattern
had a loop or not. Another study made perception highly
challenging visually by presenting fragmented line drawings
very briefly (for 0.02 s).
p0170 Notably, convergent evidence from cognitive psychology,
neuropsychology, and neuroimaging suggests that implicit
memory can influence explicit memory performance on recog-
nition tests in which people decide whether an item is old and
familiar from a prior study experience or is a new item. For
example, electrical potentials during explicit memory (recogni-
tion) tests have revealed repetition effects between 200 and
400ms. This is found when people can recognize items with
some accuracy but report being unaware of retrieving memory.
This has been taken as an implicit memory process that influ-
ences recognition performance but without awareness.
s0100 Masked priming and short-term implicit memory
p0175 In immediate repetition priming paradigms (e.g., semantic
priming), when the study item is presented very briefly (e.g.,
for 50ms) and masked, this prime stimulus is typically not
reported by people. The prime is thus taken to have been
processed only unconsciously. While it is as problematic to
establish that the prime is unconscious as it is hard to establish
that implicit memory is unconscious, clearly the prime is min-
imally available to conscious report under these masking con-
ditions. In the standard paradigm, masking involves presenting
a perceptually similar stimulus immediately before the prime
(e.g., for 500ms). This is the forward mask. The target item,
which constitutes the memory test, is presented immediately
after the prime (e.g., for 500ms) and also serves as a backward
mask, though some studies use an additional backward mask-
ing stimulus similar to the forward mask. In studies of percep-
tion, such masking seems to minimize or eliminate influences
of top-down feedback from the frontal lobe on posterior pro-
cessing. Elimination of this feedback is thought to be the
reason why the prime is processed largely or wholly outside
of conscious awareness. Using the masked priming technique,
early perceptually specific repetition effects have been found
on electrical potentials as early as 100ms after the appearance
of the item. Overall, priming effects from these studies reveal
contributions from bottom-up processing in posterior second-
ary and association cortex to feature orthographic, lexical, and
conceptual levels of word processing and perceptual and con-
ceptual levels of object processing. This variety of implicit
memory, however, depends upon recent activation of the
knowledge network by the prime that is ongoing when the
target item appears shortly thereafter, as opposed to tuning or
facilitation mechanisms. The fatigue mechanisms may also
apply. Repetition suppression has been associated withmasked
priming in neuroimaging studies.
s0105Antipriming
p0180Priming studies use new items as the baseline condition to
assess memory by comparing these responses to those for
repeated (old) items. However, recent evidence suggests that
a new item that has been intermixed with old items is not an
entirely neutral baseline control. Instead, these new items
reflect not merely processing of the novel item but also small
antipriming effects on these new items as a by-product of the
previous experience with the repeated items. Antipriming hap-
pens because objects are represented in perceptual systems in a
distributed, overlapping fashion organized according to fea-
ture similarity. Further, individual neurons are tuned broadly
to sets of features of objects, and a population code of sparse
sets of neurons represents each object. Consequently, when an
object is experienced, its representation becomes strengthened,
consistent with tuning and facilitation mechanisms. However,
the process of strengthening this representation also weakens
the representations of other objects with which it shares fea-
tures. For example, a dog has a head, body, and four legs.
Experience with a dog strengthens its representation while
also weakening the representation of other objects sharing
one or more of its features (e.g., other animals with similar
head, body, and/or leg features). Crucially, when an item with
these overlapping features is later presented as a new item
(mixedwith repeated items) on a priming test, its neural activity
is actually greater (than for repeated items) as part of a late
process of connecting its relatively weaker representation back
up. Electrical potentials indicate that this effect occurs after
1100ms, which is over 200ms after the behavioral response,
and well after earlier perceptual and conceptual implicit mem-
ory and even after any incidental episodic recognition of the
item. Instead, antipriming effects reflect a very late relearning
effect, essentially encoding of new information into memory.
However, in neuroimaging studies, due to the long time course
of the blood response on which they depend (i.e., several
seconds), neural repetition suppression effects likely reflect
some combination of perceptual and conceptual implicitmem-
ory plus a small contribution of antipriming effects, at least in
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the left inferotemporal and left and right lateral occipital areas
where antipriming effects appear.
s0110 Implicit Memory Can Result from Implicit Learning
s0115 Memory results from learning
p0185 Consequently, implicit learning (i.e., skill learning, procedural
learning, motor learning, perceptual learning) can lead to
implicit memory. This is not typically included as implicit mem-
ory proper, which instead focuses on priming phenomena.
While memory following implicit learning could be explicit
and revealed on recognition or recall tasks, it could also be
implicit. Indeed, the typical method for demonstrating that
learning has occurred in an implicit learning experiment is to
test memory indirectly. Moreover, to demonstrate that learning
is implicit, the gold standard practice is to demonstrate that the
memory that results is implicit. To do so, both indirect tests and
direct tests (i.e., recognition, recall) of memory are used. While
the indirect tests do notmeasure priming per se, they domeasure
changes in performance for old relative to new information. The
difference measured is not referred to as priming but, nonethe-
less, does fit the definition. The main exception is that implicit
learning effects can be observed only after more than one ex-
perience with the repeated information. By contrast, repeti-
tion priming paradigms involve a single presentation of the
to-be-repeated item at study (i.e., during learning). In fact, typi-
cally many experiences are required to observe implicit learning
effects.
p0190 For example, one of the most widely-studied implicit
learning tasks is the serial response time (SRT) task. In the spatial
version, people see several locations light up one at a time (e.g.,
one of four boxes will light up on a computer screen). People
press a key corresponding to the location on the screen that is lit.
Locations light up either in a repeating sequence or a new order
(e.g., random locations). Faster responses to repeated than new
locations demonstrate implicit learning. This can be taken as a
kind of location priming that demonstrates implicit memory for
the repeating sequence of locations. If direct memory tests also
indicate no conscious awareness of memory for the repeating
sequence, then the implicit memory demonstrated on the task is
taken to indicate that learning has occurred implicitly. Consis-
tent with this, the large body of research with HM and other
amnesics has also demonstrated memory without conscious
awareness for perceptual, cognitive, and motor skills (e.g.,
mirror-reversed reading), rule learning, and SRT task learning.
However, amnesic patients are impaired on implicit SRT task
learning, if higher-order associations among multiple locations
must be learned. Further, neuroimaging of normal subjects has
demonstrated learning-related activation in themedial temporal
lobe during implicit learning, despite no conscious awareness
of having learned anything. This is observed during the early
phase of implicit learning of higher-order associations when the
most new information needs to be encoded. Evidence formedial
temporal lobe involvement without awareness of memory has
also been found for probabilistic classification learning and
context learning. Thus the role of the medial temporal lobe is
not in conscious (explicit) memory per se but rather has a role
in some types of implicit learning and memory. Instead, the
computational demands of the learning task determine whether
medial temporal lobe is recruited (e.g., for higher-order
associations, sequence disambiguation, or contextual associa-
tions). In contrast, the basal ganglia have an established role in
implicit learning.Neuroimaging demonstrates basal ganglia acti-
vation during implicit learning on a wide variety of tasks. Fur-
ther, patients with Parkinson’s disease have basal ganglia
dysfunction and impaired implicit learningwith spared episodic
memory, whereas amnesic patients have impaired episodic
memory and relatively spared implicit learning. This demon-
strates a double dissociation between implicit learning and
memory versus explicit memory.
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